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| Philosophy, Neuroscience, and Behavior Analysis: Is There a Converging Consensus? |
| Saturday, May 24, 2014 |
| 2:00 PM–2:50 PM |
| W175b (McCormick Place Convention Center) |
| Area: TPC/TBA; Domain: Theory |
| CE Instructor: T. V. (Joe) Layng, Ph.D. |
| Chair: Patrick B. Marcotte (Mimio) |
| T. V. (JOE) LAYNG (Generategy, LLC) |
| PAUL THOMAS ANDRONIS (Northern Michigan University) |
| RUSSELL LAYNG (Tulane University) |
| Abstract: In the book the Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Bennett and Hacker (2003) take much of modern neuroscience to task for suggesting that there really are such "things" as images, representations, stored memories, or consciousness for that matter that are located in the brain, and for suggesting that the brain evaluates, decides, plans, or engages in “executive function.” Instead, they suggest that people do these things and that people are part of an environment that together define many of the phenomena often assigned exclusively to the brain. Though many behavior analysts may find Bennett and Hacker’s application of a Wittgensteinan analysis to neuroscience concepts to be compelling, they are are missing an essential component, that is the selective action of precedential and consequential contingencies. This panel will discuss the implications of the Bennett and Hacker (2003) and Bennett, Dennett, Hacker, Searle, and Robinson (2007) books for behavior analysis, and conversely, how their analysis may be better informed by a consequential contingency analysis. |
| Keyword(s): behavior, contingency, neuroscience, philosophy |
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